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The sub-prime crisis has shown a harsh spotlight on the practices of securities underwriters, which
provided too many complex securities that proved to ultimately have little value. This uproar calls
attention to the fact that the literature on intermediaries has carefully analyzed their incentives, but
that we know little about the broader strategic dimensions of this market. The paper explores three
related strategic dimensions of the certification market: the publicity given to applications, the coarseness
of rating patterns and the sellers' dynamic certification strategies. In the model, certifiers respond to
the sellers' desire to get a chance to be highly rated and to limit the stigma from rejection. We find
conditions under which sellers opt for an ambitious certification strategy, in which they apply to a
demanding, but non-transparent certifier and lower their ambitions when rejected. We derive the comparative
statics with respect to the sellers’ initial reputation, the probability of fortuitous disclosure, the sellers'
self-knowledge and impatience, and the concentration of the certification industry. We also analyze
the possibility that certifiers opt for a quick turnaround time at the expense of a lower accuracy. Finally,
















Bureau MF529 - Bat. F




As most markets are characterized by imperfect knowledge, informational interme-
diaries have become central to their working. From underwriters to rating agencies,
from scientiﬁc journals to entry-level examinations, from standard-setting organi-
zations to system integrators, intermediaries serve sellers and buyers by providing
product-quality information to the latter.
The literature on intermediaries has carefully analyzed their incentives. By con-
trast, little do we know about three related strategic dimensions of the certiﬁcation
market: the publicity given to applications, the coarseness of rating patterns, and the
sellers’ dynamic certiﬁcation strategies. Policies in these matters exhibit substantial
heterogeneity. Regarding the transparency of the application process, scientiﬁcj o u r -
nals, certiﬁed bond rating agencies, lenders, underwriters, employers, organic food
certiﬁers, or prospective dates usually do not reveal rejected applications. By con-
trast, entry-level examinations companies (SAT, GMAT,...) disclose previous, and
presumably unsuccessful attempts by the student. Regarding the coarseness of grad-
ing, many institutions, such as most scientiﬁc journals, adopt a “minimum standard”
or “pass-fail” strategy, while others, such as entry-level examination ﬁrms, report an
exact grade. While a ﬁne partition in the grading space presumably requires more
resources than a pass-fail approach, what drives the choice of coarseness is unclear.
Table 1 reports the strategies of some certiﬁers regarding publicity and grading.
Note that “application opacity” refers to the certiﬁer’s policy, not necessarily to the
outcome. For example, one may fortuitously learn that a paper was submitted to and
rejected by a journal; furthermore, a delayed publication may create some stigma as
the profession is unsure as to whether the delay is due to the author, slow editing
or a rejection. Similarly, while academic departments, corporations and partnerships
warn in advance assistant professors and junior members that they are unlikely to
receive tenure or keep their job, thereby allowing them to attempt to disguise a layoﬀ
as a quit, information leakages and the inference drawn from the very act of quitting
provide some limit to this strategy.
2Table 1
Our lack of understanding of the certiﬁcation process has been highlighted by the
recent eﬀorts to ensure transparency of the securities rating process, particularly in
the area of structured ﬁnance. On an explicit level, all major rating agencies follow
a well-deﬁned process, whose end product is the publication of a rating based on
an objective analysis. But ﬁrms have been historically able to get rating agencies
not to disclose ratings that displease them. First, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) (2008) notes that even if a ﬁrm appeals a rating that displeases
it and the appeal is rejected, the proposed rating may not be published. Instead,
a “break-up fee” is paid by the issuer to the rating agency to compensate it for its
eﬀorts.
Alternatively, as Portnoy (2006) notes, consulting services oﬀered in recent years
by rating agencies to issuers may make an apparently transparent process opaque:
With respect to ancillary services, credit rating agencies market pre-
rating assessments and corporate consulting. For an additional fee, is-
suers present hypothetical scenarios to the rating agencies to understand
how a particular transaction–such as a merger, asset sale, or stock
repurchase–might aﬀect their ratings. Although the rating agencies ar-
gue that fees from ancillary services are not substantial, there is evidence
3that they are increasing. In addition, with respect to rating agency as-
sessment services, once an agency has indicated what rating it would give
an issuer after a corporate transaction, the agency would be subject to
pressure to give that rating. For example, if an agency were paid a fee
for advice and advised an issuer that a stock repurchase would not aﬀect
its rating, it would be more diﬃcult for the agency to change that rating
after the issuer completed the repurchase.
This point is also made in a recent congressional testimony by Coﬀee (2008):
The inherent conﬂict facing the credit rating agency has been aggra-
vated by their recent marketing of advisory and consulting services to
their clients. Today, the rating agencies receives one fee to consult with
a client, explain its model, and indicate the likely outcome of the rating
process; then, it receives a second fee to actually deliver the rating (if the
client wishes to go forward once it has learned the likely outcome). The
result is that the client can decide not to seek the rating if it learns that it
would be less favorable than it desires; the result is a loss of transparency
to the market.
In response to these behaviors, the SEC (2008) proposed on June 11, 2008 that
rating agencies dramatically increase their transparency:
Require [rating agencies] to make all their ratings and their subsequent
rating actions publicly available, to facilitate comparisons of [rating agen-
cies] by making it easier to analyze the performance of the credit ratings
the [rating agencies] issue in terms of assessing creditworthiness.
Somehow, certiﬁers’ policies must reﬂect the demands of the two sides of the
market, as well as who has “gatekeeping power” over the certiﬁcation process. In the
majority of applications, on which we will mainly be focusing here, the seller chooses
the certiﬁer. While they need to be credible vis-à-vis the buyers, the certiﬁers must
ﬁrst cater to the sellers’ desires.
4As for dynamic certiﬁcation strategies, sellers most often adopt a top-down sub-
mission strategy, in which they apply ﬁrst to the best certiﬁers and then, after
rejections, move down the pecking order. Why do we observe this pattern, and
what determines the rejection rate, or equivalently whether submissions tend to be
ambitious or realistic?
To address these questions, we develop a model in which certiﬁers respond to
the sellers’ demand for certiﬁcation. At an abstract level, a certiﬁer’s policy maps
the information it acquires about the quality of the product into a public signal;
and importantly the public signal may be the lack thereof: the certiﬁer can (try
to) conceal the existence of an application in order not to convey bad news about
quality. By contrast, we allow for fortuitous disclosure, as buyers may hear about
the application (“through the grapevine”) even if the certiﬁer does not disclose it.
We ﬁnd conditions under which sellers opt for an ambitious strategy, in which
they apply to a demanding, but non-transparent certiﬁer and lower their ambitions
when rejected. We derive the comparative statics with respect to the sellers’ initial
reputation, the probability of fortuitous disclosure, the sellers’ self-knowledge and
impatience, and the concentration of the certiﬁcation industry. We also analyze the
possibility that certiﬁers opt for a quick turn-around strategy at the expense of a
lower accuracy. Finally, we investigate the opportunity of regulating transparency.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 lay down the basic model,
in which multi-tier grading is costly and only minimum-standard certiﬁcation is
oﬀered. It solves for a competitive or concentrated certifying industry equilibrium
and conducts the welfare analysis of transparency regulation. Section 4 analyzes
the impact of the sellers’ accuracy of information about the quality of their oﬀering.
Section 5 generalizes the basic model by endogeneizing the sellers’ quality choice.
Section 6 examines the eﬀect of entry by certiﬁe r sw h ot r a d eo ﬀ accuracy and turn-
around time. Section 7 allows for multi-tier grading. Section 8 summarizes our
insights and discusses a number of open questions.
Relationship to the literature
There is a large literature on certiﬁcation in corporate ﬁnance, industrial orga-
5nization or labor markets. In corporate ﬁnance, among the most cited papers are
Booth and Smith (1986), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Weiss (1991). Much of
this literature focuses on the trade-oﬀ for certiﬁed agents between the cost of cer-
tiﬁcation and its beneﬁts in terms of signaling, reduced agency costs or assortative
matching. Much less has been written on the industrial organization of the certify-
ing industry. An exception is Lerner-Tirole (2006), in which certiﬁers diﬀerentiate
through their composition and decision processes, making them more or less friendly
to sponsors’ interests. The current paper investigates certiﬁers’ positioning with
respect to transparency; it further analyzes sequential rejections, an issue that was
shown not to arise in Lerner-Tirole, in which the technology sponsor’s objective was
simply to have the technology adopted.
Other exceptions are the papers by Morrison and White (2005) and Gill and Sgroi
(2003). In particular, banks in Morrison-White apply to regulators with diﬀerent
perceived abilities. A successful application to a tough regulator allows banks to
raise more deposits. As regulators make mistakes, banks may get a second chance.
On the other hand, the Morrison-White paper focuses on rather diﬀerent issues than
our paper; for instance, it assumes that applications are transparent.
2 The model
Time is discrete and runs from −∞ to +∞. There is a mass 1 of buyers and a steady
inﬂow of sellers, each with one product. For simplicity, the representative seller’s
quality i is initially unknown to both sides of the market and can take one of three
values: high (H), low (L) or “abysmal” (−∞), with respective beneﬁts for the buyers
bi ∈ {bH,b L,−∞} with bH >b L > −∞. Conditional on not being abysmal, quality
is high with prior probability ρ and low with prior probability 1 − ρ.B u y e r sp r e f e r
quality H to quality L, and won’t consider the product unless its quality has been
certiﬁed to be at least L. A seller whose quality cannot be certiﬁed to be at least L
does not bring the product to the market and obtains zero proﬁts.
Assuming that this certiﬁcation has taken place, let b ρ denote the buyers’ posterior
b e l i e fa tt h et i m ea tw h i c ht h ep r o d u c ti sb r o u g h tt ot h em a r k e t( m o r eo nt h i s
6shortly). Let Si(b ρ) denote the seller’s expected gain from putting a product of
quality i on the market when beliefs are b ρ. We will assume that Si is always positive
and is increasing in ^ ρ. Let us provide a few illustrations:
Example 1 (sale). Suppose that production is costless and that the seller sells the
product to homogenous, price-taking consumers. Then, under such ﬁrst-degree price
discrimination
Si(b ρ)=max{Ee ρ[b],0}
is independent of i, where Ee ρ[b] ≡ b ρbH +( 1 − b ρ)bL denotes the users’ posterior
assessment of quality.
Example 2 (sale with imperfect price discrimination). Following up on Example 1,
assume now that there are two types of users, indexed by a = aH (proportion μ)o r
aL (proportion 1−μ)w i t haH >a L.I fb b = Ee ρ[b], the gross surplus of a user of type
j ∈ {H,L} is aj + b b. “Belief-sensitive pricing” arises when user surplus depends on
posterior beliefs b ρ,1 i.e., when
aL + bH > μ(aH + bH) and aL + bL < μ(aH + bL).
Then, Si(b ρ) (which again is independent of i)i sg i v e nb y
Si(b ρ)=
±
aL + b b for b ρ ≥ ρ0
μ(aH + b b) for b ρ < ρ0
where
aL +[ ρ0bH +( 1 − ρ0)bL]=μ[aH + ρ0bH +( 1 − ρ0)bL].
Buyers then have (average) utility
B(b ρ)=
¯
μ(aH − aL) for b ρ ≥ ρ0
0 for b ρ < ρ0
.
E x a m p l e3( c l i e n t e l ee ﬀects / assortative matching). Some buyers may be inter-
ested solely in high-quality oﬀerings. For example, ﬁnancial institutions put, due to
1The other two cases are isomorphic to Example 1, as the volume of sales is not aﬀected by
beliefs.
7prudential regulation reasons, a particularly high valuation on safe securities. Full
grading allows the seller to better segment the market. Suppose that a fraction of
buyers buy only high-quality products, at price KbH where K>1 .O t h e rb u y e r sa r e
less discriminating and are as depicted in Example 1. Then
Si(b ρ)=KbH1 I{e ρ=1} + max{Ee ρ[b],0}1 I{e ρ<1},
is again independent of i.
Example 4 (spillovers from adoption). A researcher whose paper is read and used by
the profession, or a technology sponsor whose intellectual property becomes part of
ar o y a l t y - f r e es t a n d a r db e n e ﬁt only indirectly from adoption (prestige, referencing,
diﬀusion of ideas for a researcher, network eﬀects or spillover onto complementary
products for a technology sponsor). Letting si denote the seller’s gross beneﬁtf r o m
adoption the seller’s surplus is then:2
Si(b ρ)=si1 I{Ee ρ[b]≥0}.
Note that in this case the seller’s surplus in general depends directly on quality i.
Deﬁnition 1: Sellers are:
strongly information loving if for all ρ
S
00





strongly information averse if for all ρ
S
00





strongly information neutral if for all ρ
S
00





This deﬁnition holds only for diﬀerentiable payoﬀ functions. A weaker property
(implied by deﬁnition 1 in the case of diﬀerentiable payoﬀ functions) is:
2Where 1 I{·} is the indicator function.
8Deﬁnition 2: Sellers are:
information loving if
ρSH(1)+( 1 − ρ)SL(0) > ρSH(ρ)+( 1 − ρ)SL(ρ)
information averse if
ρSH(1)+( 1 − ρ)SL(0) < ρSH(ρ)+( 1 − ρ)SL(ρ)
information neutral if
ρSH(1)+( 1 − ρ)SL(0)=ρSH(ρ)+( 1 − ρ)SL(ρ).
If bL ≥ 0, the seller is information neutral in Examples 1 and 4, and information
loving in Example 3. If bL <0 , she is information loving when she fully appropriates
the consumer surplus through a price (Examples 1 and 3).
By contrast, the seller is information averse if Eρ[b] >0and if she is unable to
charge the buyer and therefore has buyer adoption as her primary objective. The
seller always beneﬁts from a no grading, simple-acceptance policy (see Lerner-Tirole,
2006), weakly so in the two-type case when bL ≥ 0 (as in Example 4) and strictly so
with two types and bL <0or with a continuum of types, some of them negative. That
way, she is able to “pool” negative-buyer-surplus states with positive-buyer-surplus
ones.3
Certiﬁers.P r o ﬁt-maximizing4 certiﬁers audit quality. Throughout the paper, we will
assume that, through reputation or a credible internal-audit mechanism, certiﬁers
a r ea b l et oc o m m i tt oad i s c l o s u r ep o l i c y ,t h a ti st oam a p p i n gf r o mw h a tt h e yl e a r n
3To illustrate information aversion, consider the following two examples from the Harvard cam-
pus. Harvard College has seen such rampant grade inﬂation that grades provided little information:
in recent years, the median grade has been an A-, and over 80% of the students graduated with
honors (Rosovsky and Hartley, 2002). At Harvard Business School, the School until recently had a
formal policy that prohibited students from disclosing their grade point average to prospective re-
cruiters (Schuker, 2005). Such “pooling” of certiﬁed students is much less common with second-tier
institutions.
4Our results also hold if certiﬁers maximize their market share in the certiﬁcation market.
9to what they disclose to buyers.5 This ability to commit to a disclosure policy makes
the question of choice of their incentive scheme moot,6, and so we can assume without
loss of generality that they demand a ﬁxed fee for the certiﬁcation service. To sum
up, a certiﬁer’s strategy is thus the combination of a ﬁxed fee and a disclosure policy.
In some instances, we will alternatively assume that certiﬁers do not charge ﬁxed fees
and that their objective is to maximize market share. When certiﬁers are atomistic
and competition is perfect, the outcome will be exactly the same. Diﬀerences will
potentially materialize when we consider monopolistic competition.
Because certiﬁers are useless unless they rule out the abysmal quality, we can
consider three types of certiﬁers, two “minimum standard” certiﬁe r sa n do n e“ f u l l
grade” certiﬁer:
A tier-1 certiﬁer ascertains that b = bH or b ∈ {bL ,−∞}.T i e r - 1 c e r t i ﬁers fur-
thermore do not disclose applications for which they ﬁnd that b ∈ {bL ,−∞},a s
such disclosure of bad news (a “rejection”) is unappealing to sellers and reduces the
demand for such certiﬁers’ services.
A tier-2 certiﬁer certiﬁes that b ∈ {bH ,bL} or b = −∞.7
A multi-tier certiﬁer discloses the true quality: b = bH ,bL or −∞.
We will normalize the audit cost incurred by a minimum standard certiﬁer to be
0. By contrast, the cost of a ﬁner grading may be positive. Certiﬁers compete for
5It is not certain, of course, that this assumption always holds in the real world. For instance,
some critics have accused rating agencies of initially being excessively generous when rating new
oﬀerings, then revising the rating months later. They suggest that the natural organizations to
question this behavior, the investment banks, have little incentive to do so, because they have
typically ‘laid oﬀ’ any exposure to the securities through reﬁnancings (U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2003). Certiﬁers’ reputation building is analyzed in Bouvard-Levy (2008) and Mathis-
Mc Andrews-Rochet (2008).
6An arbitrary incentive scheme gives rise to an equilibrium disclosure policy and therefore can
be duplicated through a ﬁxed payment (equal to the expected payment under the incentive scheme)
and the resulting disclosure policy.
7Obviously, the certiﬁer’s reporting strategy for b = −∞ is irrelevant, as the seller then always
makes no proﬁt. If by contrast we assumed that sellers have other products, the production of
an "abysmal quality" could be a bad signal for other oﬀerings. One would then expect that the
information that b = −∞ would not be disclosed either.
10the sellers’ business. The certiﬁcation market, unless otherwise stated, is perfectly
competitive. Equilibrium fees are then equal to 0.
Consider a seller who arrives at date t and chooses a certiﬁer. She can contract
with a single certiﬁer in each period. Contingent on the outcome of certiﬁcation(s),
the seller chooses the date, t + τ (τ ≥ 0), at which she brings the product to the
market. If the buyers’ beliefs at that date are b ρ = b ρt+τ, then the seller’s utility is
δ
τSi(b ρt+τ)
where δ <1is the discount factor. Thus the seller maximizes
E[δ
τSi(b ρt+τ)].
In our model, there are only two (relevant) levels of quality and audits of a given
kind always deliver the same outcome.8 A n ds oad a t e - t product will actually be
brought to the market either at t or at t + 1.
There can be fortuitous disclosure:W h e n a s e l l e r a r r i v e s a t d a t e t and does
not bring her product to the market until date t+1, with probability d ≥ 0,b u y e r s
exogenously discover that the date-(t+1) introduction corresponds to a date-t arrival.
With probability 1 − d, buyers receive no such information.9
Finally, we will analyze perfect Bayesian equilibria. If multiple equilibria co-exist,
that can be Pareto ranked for the sellers, we will select the Pareto dominant one.
3 Minimum standard certiﬁers
3.1 Determinants of tiered certiﬁcation
Note that there is no point applying to a tier-2 certiﬁer unless one goes to the
market following an endorsement. Similarly, after an application to a tier-1 certiﬁer,
8There is no certiﬁer-idiosyncratic noise, unlike in Morrison-White (2005).
9Fortuitous disclosures will in equilibrium increase the cost of being rejected. Note that learning
that the seller arrived at date t is here equivalent to learning that her application was rejected at
date t. We could easily enrich the model by adding “slow sellers”, who arrive at date t, but apply
only at date t + 1. Such sellers would suﬀer an unfair stigma if the date of their arrival is made
public, as do papers in academia that authors are slow at submitting to a journal.
11the seller brings the product to the market if the latter is a high-quality one and
applies to a tier-2 certiﬁer in case of rejection. The equilibrium thus exhibits the
familiar pattern of moving down the pecking order, with diminishing expectations.10
Let x denote the fraction of sellers who choose an ambitious strategy (start with
at i e r - 1c e r t i ﬁer, and apply to a tier-2 certiﬁer in case of rejection). Fraction 1 − x
select the safe strategy (go directly to a tier-2 certiﬁer).
When faced with a product certiﬁed by a tier-2 certiﬁer, buyers form beliefs:
b ρ = 0 if they know the product introduction is delayed (as they infer
a rejection in the previous period), and
b ρ = b ρ(x) ≡ (1 − x)ρ/[1 − x + x(1 − ρ)(1 − d)] otherwise.
Note that b ρ(x) decreases from ρ to 0 as x increases from 0 to 1.
Let
W
1(b ρ) ≡ ρSH(1)+( 1 − ρ)δ[dSL(0)+( 1 − d)SL(b ρ)]
and
W
2(b ρ) ≡ ρSH(b ρ)+( 1 − ρ)SL(b ρ)
denote the expected payoﬀs11 when applying to a tier-1 or tier-2 certiﬁer, when
certiﬁcation by a tier-2 certiﬁer delivers reputation b ρ.N o t et h a t∂W2
∂e ρ > ∂W1
∂e ρ ≥ 0.
• Safe-strategy equilibrium. It is an equilibrium for sellers to all adopt a safe
strategy (x = 0)i fW2(ρ) ≥ W1(ρ):
ρSH(ρ)+( 1 − ρ)SL(ρ) ≥ ρSH(1)+δ(1 − ρ)[(1 − d)SL(ρ)+dSL(0)],
or
(1 − ρ)[(1 − δ)SL(ρ)+δd[SL(ρ) − SL(0)]] ≥ ρ[SH(1) − SH(ρ)]. (1)
Condition (1) captures the costs and beneﬁts of a safe strategy. A safe strategy
avoids delaying introduction when quality is low, thereby economizing (1−δ)SL(ρ).
It also prevents the stigma associated with fortuitous disclosure, and thereby provides
10An exception to this widespread pattern is provided by publications in law journals, where
authors build on acceptance to move up the quality ladder.
11Conditional on b ∈ {bL,b H}.
12gain δd[SL(ρ)−SL(0)]. The cost of a safe strategy is of course the lack of recognition
of a high quality SH(1) − SH(ρ).
Unsurprisingly, a safe-strategy equilibrium is more likely to emerge, the lower the
discount factor (i.e., the longer the certiﬁcation length), and the higher the rate of
fortuitous disclosure. Indeed, when δ = 1, the safe-strategy equilibrium never exists
(i.e., even for d = 1) if the seller is information-loving.
• Ambitious-strategy equilibrium. Next, consider an equilibrium in which all
sellers adopt an ambitious strategy. Certiﬁcation by a second-tier certiﬁer is then
very bad news. Thus x = 1 is an equilibrium if and only if W1(0) ≥ W2(0):
ρSH(1)+δ(1 − ρ)SL(0) ≥ ρSH(0)+( 1 − ρ)SL(0) (2)
• Mixed-strategy equilibrium. Finally, consider a mixed equilibrium in which
x>0(some sellers adopt an ambitious strategy), that is W1(b ρ(x)) = W2(b ρ(x)):
ρSH(1)+δ(1 − ρ)[(1 − d)]SL(b ρ(x)) + dSL(0)] = ρSH(b ρ(x)) + (1 − ρ)SL(b ρ(x)). (3)
Condition (3) has a unique solution x, if it exists. Note also that whenever a
mixed equilibrium exists, the safe-strategy equilibrium also exists, and it dominates
the mixed equilibrium from the point of view of the sellers.
Interestingly, there may exist multiple pure equilibria. For example for d = 0,t h e
conditions for the safe-strategy and the ambitious-strategy equilibria can be written:
ρSH(1) ≤ ρSH(ρ)+( 1 − ρ)(1 − δ)SL(ρ) (4)
and
ρSH(1) ≥ ρSH(0)+( 1 − ρ)(1 − δ)SL(0). (5)
Indeed, the sellers’ certiﬁcation strategies are strategic complements: Ambitious
certiﬁcation strategies devalorize tier-2 certiﬁcation, thereby encouraging ambitious





























Pareto-dominant one:  ρ = ρ
(safe strategy)
Equilibrium conﬁgurations.
Proposition 1 With minimum standard certiﬁers,
(i) the (Pareto-dominant) equilibrium exhibits
• the ambitious strategy of applying to a non-transparent tier-1 certiﬁer, and then,
in case of rejection, to a tier-2 certiﬁer (tiered certiﬁcation) iﬀ
(1 − ρ)[(1 − δ)SL(ρ)+δd[SL(ρ) − SL(0)]] < ρ[SH(1) − SH(ρ)],
• the safe strategy of directly applying to a tier-2 certiﬁer otherwise.
(ii) ambitious strategies are more likely, the lower the probability of fortuitous dis-
closure (the lower d is), and the more patient the seller (the higher δ is); when δ = 1
and d = 1 ambitious strategies are adopted if and only if the seller is information
loving.
14Let us comment on the interpretation of an equilibrium in which sellers do not
apply for tier-1 certiﬁcation, given that observed certiﬁer rankings always start with
"tier-1", almost by deﬁnition. One interpretation is that this particular class of sellers
applies to tier-2 certiﬁers (on this, see also Section 4 below). Another interpretation
speaks to the very deﬁnition of "tier-1", "tier-2", etc. What we here call "tier-2"
could in practice be called "tier-1" if no seller applied to what we deﬁne as "tier-
1" certiﬁers. For example, no "super tier-1" journal has been created that would
be more demanding than the top-5 economics journals and take, say, the ﬁve best
papers of the year.
An example of impatient sellers in many American universities is junior faculty
members, who are about to come up for tenure. For instance, an assistant professor in
the strategy group at a business school may submit a promising empirical analysis to
Management Science, rather than submitting it to the American Economic Review.
In part, this choice is driven by the diﬀerent time frames that the two journals
typically have for reviewing papers (on this, see Section 6). But in many cases, the
junior faculty member senses that a rejection by a tier-1 certiﬁer would make the
track record at the tenure review too thin.12
Is lack of transparency linked to market structure?
To answer this question, assume by contrast that the market for tier-1 certiﬁ-
cation is monopolized, while tier-2 certiﬁers are still competitive. In the absence of





whenever (1) is violated (i.e., whenever the sellers use the services of the tier-1
certiﬁer). In cases (i) and (iii) of Figure 1, the sellers Pareto coordinate on the safe
strategy for all FNT ≥ 0. Thus, under non-transparency, the outcome is the same
as with a competitive tier-1 industry, except for the monopolist lump-sum payment
FNT in case (ii) of Figure 1.
12The junior faculty’s impatience can reasonably be assumed to be common knowledge, and so
we are performing comparative statics with respect to the discount factor (part (ii) of Proposition
1).







(assuming FT ≥ 0.I f FT <0 , then the monopolist faces no demand at any non-
negative fee). We conclude that the absence of transparency is not driven by market
structure.
Proposition 2 Suppose that tier-2 certiﬁcation is competitive. A monopoly tier-1
certiﬁer opts for non-transparency so as to maximize the sellers’ incentive to apply
for tier-1 certiﬁcation. Up to a lump-sum transfer, the outcome is exactly the same
as for a competitive tier-1 industry.
Note that this result would also hold if certiﬁers did not charge fees and cared
only about market share: Regardless of the number of tier-1 certiﬁers, transparency
is a dominated strategy.
3.2 Regulation of transparency
In reaction to the subprime crisis the US Treasury chose to require structured in-
vestment vehicles to disclose ratings (even unfavorable ones). This section studies
whether regulation of disclosure increases welfare in industries in which sellers shop
around for certiﬁcation.13
Suppose that a regulator can require transparency of applications (this amounts
to setting d = 1) and that this regulation cannot be evaded. Application to a tier-2
certiﬁer yields (“T” refers to “transparency”) W2T(b ρ)=W2(b ρ).





1(b ρ) whenever b ρ >0 ,
13We focus on governmental regulations. An interesting and related subject of inquiry could be
concerned with social regulation (social norms). For example, a social group may disagree when
one of its members reveals a rejection incurred by another member (in professional or personal
matters); society then “regulates” against transparency.
16Application to a transparent tier-1 certiﬁer (with payoﬀs as depicted by the dashed
horizontal line in Figure 1) is an equilibrium behavior if and only if
W
1 (0) ≥ W
2(ρ).
And so if W1 (0) <W 2(ρ) <W 1(ρ),o r
ρSH(1)+δ(1−ρ)SL(0) < ρSH(ρ)+(1−ρ)SL(ρ) < ρSH(1)+δ(1−ρ)[(1−d)SL(ρ)+dSL(0)],
the transparency requirement increases the sellers’ welfare: see case (ii) in Figure
1. In the other parameter conﬁgurations (cases (i) and (iii) in Figure 1) it has no
impact on equilibrium outcomes and welfare.
Proposition 3 Transparency improves sellers’ welfare.
Self-Regulation. Relatedly, would tier-1 certiﬁers agree among each other not to
compete on the transparency dimension and to disclose applications? The answer is
no, as they would thereby diminish their collective attractiveness. Put diﬀerently,
a self-regulated disclosure requirement would either have no impact or drive tier-1
certiﬁers out of business.14
User welfare. How does transparency impact users’ welfare? As we have seen, trans-
parency regulation makes a diﬀerence only in case (ii) of Figure 1, by killing the
ambitious-strategy equilibrium. The issue is thus whether users beneﬁtf r o mm o r eo r
less information. The answer to this question is case-speciﬁc. In the ﬁrst-degree price
discrimination illustrations of Examples 1 and 3, users have no surplus and so we can
conﬁne welfare analysis to that of sellers. In Example 4, either ρbH +( 1−ρ)bL ≥ 0
and then the equilibrium is always a safe-strategy one, or ρbH +( 1 − ρ)bL <0and
14To prove these assertions, one must assume that certiﬁers are slightly diﬀerentiated (and thus
can demand a positive ﬁxed fee): As in Hotelling’s model, the total cost for a buyer of using a certiﬁer
is the ﬁxed fee charged by the certiﬁer plus a function of the “distance” between the certiﬁer and
the buyer. For example, one can imagine that tier-k certiﬁers (k = 1,2) are on an Hotelling-Lerner-
Salop circle and that sellers are distributed randomly along the circle, incurring a transportation
cost of “traveling” to a speciﬁcs e l l e r .O n ec a nt h e nt a k et h el i m i ta st h ed i ﬀerentiation vanishes.
In the absence of diﬀerentiation, proﬁts are always equal to 0, and regulatory choices are a matter
of indiﬀerence to the certiﬁcation industry.
17the equilibrium is always the ambitious-strategy one: In either case transparency is
irrelevant.
The analysis is more interesting for Example 2 (imperfect price discrimination).
In the belief-sensitive-pricing case in Example 2,15 user net surplus in the ambitious-
strategy and safe-strategy equilibria are:
B1 = δ(1 − ρ)μ(aH − aL)
B2 =
¯
μ(aH − aL) for ρ ≥ ρ0
0 for ρ < ρ0
respectively. Thus a transparency regulation that moves the equilibrium from am-
bitious to safe strategies increases (decreases) user welfare if ρ ≥ ρ0 (if ρ < ρ0).
We thus see that while regulation always beneﬁts sellers, it need not beneﬁt users.
This is a noteworthy observation, in view of the fact that transparency regulation
is often heralded as protecting users; needless to say, with naive users, the case for
transparency regulation would be stronger.
4 Seller self-knowledge
For expositional simplicity, we have assumed that the seller is a poor judge to assess
the quality of her product for the buyers. In some cases, sellers are likely to have some
information about the quality of their product. Suppose that a fraction α of sellers
k n o wt h e i r“ t y p e ”( af r a c t i o n1−α have no clue, as earlier). Then, maintaining the
assumption that only minimum-standard certiﬁcation is available, knowledgeable H
sellers apply to a tier-1 certiﬁer, and knowledgeable L sellers apply to a tier-2 certiﬁer.
15I.e., when aL + bH > μ(aH + bH) and aL + bL < μ(aH + bH). The sellers’ payoﬀsi nt h et w o
potential equilibrium conﬁgurations are:
W1 = ρ(aL + bH)+δ(1 − ρ)μ(aH + bL)
W2 =
¯
aL +[ ρbH +( 1 − ρ)bL] for ρ ≥ ρ0
μ[aH +[ ρbH +( 1 − ρ)bL]] for ρ < ρ0.
18As earlier let us look for the condition under which direct tier-2 applications by
unknowledgeable sellers is an equilibrium. Let
b ρ =
(1 − α)ρ
(1 − α)ρ +( 1 − ρ)
denote the probability of high quality following certiﬁc a t i o nb yat i e r - 2c e r t i ﬁer.
Condition (1) is replaced by
(1 − ρ)[(1 − δ)SL(b ρ)+δd[SL(b ρ) − SL(0)] ≥ ρ[SH(1) − SH(b ρ)].
Because b ρ < ρ, this condition has become harder to satisfy.
Proposition 4 An increase in the fraction of sellers who are able to assess the
quality of their product (an increase in α) makes tiered certiﬁcation by the uninformed
more likely.
An improvement in the quality of self-assessment may therefore have an am-
biguous impact on the probability of rejections: The direct and obvious eﬀect is to
reduce rejections by matching applications to the true quality. However, it increases
the stigma attached to second-tier submissions (low-ambition applications are more
likely to be low-caliber products): The choice of certiﬁer then becomes a stronger
signal of quality.
5 Endogenous quality
This section shows that our analysis is unchanged when the choice of quality depends
on the equilibrium of the certiﬁcation process. Suppose that quality depends on the
seller’s investment eﬀort e ∈ [e,e]. We are interested in modeling a dimension of
eﬀo r tt h a ta ﬀects the likelihood of a high quality outcome but does not change the
probability of an abysmal outcome. It is reasonable to think that those margins
respond to diﬀerent forms of investment, and that for some of the examples that we
19have in mind, the latter margin would be quite inelastic.16 Hence our focus on the
former.
Let q be the probability that a product is not abysmal. A higher eﬀort increases
the probability of the high quality ρ(e) outcome conditional on a non-abysmal out-
come. Let ψ(e) denote the disutility of eﬀort. We assume that ρ(e) is increasing
and concave in e and that ψ(e) is increasing and convex in e with ρ0 (e)=+ ∞
and ψ
0 (e)=0. To simplify the analysis, we also assume that SL (¦)=SH (¦) (as in
Examples 1 through 3), and that d = 0.
We deﬁne two ex-ante payoﬀ functions W1 and W2 as follows:
W
1 (^ ρ) ≡ max
e {q[ρ(e)S(1)+δ(1 − ρ(e))S(^ ρ)] − ψ(e)}
and
W
2 (^ ρ) ≡ max
e {qS(^ ρ) − ψ(e)}.
Let e1 (^ ρ) and e2 (^ ρ) be the solutions of the maximization problems underlying W1
and W2. Clearly, e2 (^ ρ) = e.




d^ ρ for all ^ ρ.
















The result follows immediately.
There are two potential equilibria. The ambitious strategy equilibrium eﬀort level






16More generally, the analysis extends straightforwardly to a small elasticity of abysmal quality
to eﬀort.
20The safe strategy is an equilibrium if and only if
W
2 (ρ(e)) ≥ W
1 (ρ(e))
while the ambitious strategy equilibrium is an equilibrium if and only if
W
1 (0) ≥ W
2 (0).
>From Lemma 1, an equilibrium always exists. The safe and risky strategy
equilibria co-exist over a range of parameters. When there are multiple equilibria, we
adapt our Pareto dominant selection criterion and select the ex-ante Pareto dominant
equilibrium. The analysis is then identical to the case where eﬀort is exogenous,
with ρ replaced by ρ(e) and W1 and W2 replaced by W1 and W2. In particular,
transparency weakly improves sellers’ ex-ante welfare. When it does so strictly, it
replaces an ambitious strategy equilibrium with high quality investment by a safe
strategy equilibrium with low quality investment.
6Q u i c k t u r n - a r o u n d
First- and second-tier certiﬁers may choose their certiﬁcation delays so as to attract
sellers. Shorter lags may increase the certiﬁcation cost (here normalized at 0) or
result in reduced accuracy. We focus on the latter for the moment.
To capture the idea that short turn-around times beneﬁt the sellers, we assume
that a quick turn-around certiﬁcation takes less time (and therefore is subject to
discount factor ^ δ > δ), while both tier-1 and tier-2 certiﬁcation take one period.17
Thus a seller who is rejected by a quick turn-around certiﬁer could for instance apply
to a tier-2 certiﬁer without losing as much time as if he had been rejected by a tier-1
certiﬁer. Furthermore, we will make assumptions so that it is never optimal to turn
directly to a tier-2 certiﬁer, and that it is never optimal to turn to a quick turn-
around certiﬁer after a rejection either by a tier-1 certiﬁer or by a quick turn-around
17In order to avoid integer problems (and the concomitant possibility that the date of product
introduction reveal the strategy), one must assume in this section that sellers arrive in continuous
time (but the certiﬁcation length is still discrete).
21certiﬁer. We further assume that d = 0,a n dt h a tSH(b ρ)=SL(b ρ) ≡ S(b ρ) for all b ρ,s o





ρ(1 − zH)+( 1 − ρ)zL
be the posterior belief following an H signal by a quick turn-around certiﬁer. Without
loss of generality, we assume that such a signal is good news for the quality of the
product, i.e. that ρ+ > ρ. This is equivalent to requiring that the fraction of false
negatives and false positives be not too high: 1>z H + zL.
Our ﬁrst assumption is suﬃc i e n tt oe n s u r et h a ti ti sa l w a y sp r e f e r a b l et ot u r nt o
at i e r - 1c e r t i ﬁer and then apply to a tier-2 certiﬁer rather than to apply directly to
at i e r - 2c e r t i ﬁer:
S(1) >S(ρ)
1 − (1 − ρ)δ
ρ
. (6)
Our second assumption is suﬃcient to ensure that after a rejection by a tier-1
certiﬁer, a seller does not want to try a quick turn-around certiﬁcation next:
zL <





Last, it must be the case that a seller does not want to turn to another quick turn-
around certiﬁer after being rejected by one. A suﬃcient condition for the absence of
such repeated attempts is that false positives be perfectly correlated among quick
turn-around certiﬁers, and so a failed attempt to be certiﬁed by such a certiﬁer does
not call for other attempts.
Given these assumptions, the only relevant strategic consideration is whether
to apply to a quick turn-around certiﬁe ro rt oat i e r - 1c e r t i ﬁer. Denote by y the
fraction of applicants who opt for a quick turn-around certiﬁcation rather than tier-1
certiﬁers.
Let b ρ2 = b ρ2(y) denote the posterior beliefs following tier-2 certiﬁcation:
b ρ2 (y)=
yρzH
yρzH + y(1 − ρ)(1 − zL)+( 1 − y)(1 − ρ)
.
We necessarily have ρ+ > ρ > b ρ2 (y). With false positives, the higher y, the higher
b ρ2 (y) and the lower the stigma associated with tier 2 certiﬁcation.
22Sellers turn to a certiﬁer with low turn-around time rather than to a tier-1 certiﬁer
if and only if Ψ(y) ≥ 0 where:
Ψ(y)=^ δ[ρ(1 − zH)+( 1 − ρ)zL]S(ρ+)+[ ρzH +( 1 − ρ)(1 − zL)]^ δδS(b ρ2(y))
−δ[ρS(1)+δ(1 − ρ)S(b ρ2(y))].
The sign of Ψ0(y) determines whether the choices between tier-1 certiﬁcation and
quick turn-around certiﬁcation are strategic complements (positive sign) or substi-
tutes (negative sign). Decisions are strategic complements if and only if
ρzH +( 1 − ρ)(1 − zL) ≥
δ
^ δ
(1 − ρ). (8)
The left-hand side of (8) is the probability of being rejected when applying to a
quick turn-around certiﬁer. The right-hand side of (8) is the discounted probability
of being rejected by a tier-1 certiﬁer. Increasing y reduces the stigma of applying
t oat i e r - 2c e r t i ﬁer which impacts the payoﬀ of both the tier-1 certiﬁcation strategy
and the quick turn-around application strategy in proportion to these probabilities.
The higher zH, the lower zL and the lower δ, the more likely is (8) to be veriﬁed.
It may be worth noting that strategic complementarity also obtains when the quick
turn-around certiﬁer mimics the acceptance rate of a tier-2 certiﬁer.18
When (8) holds, then there can be multiple equilibria. This occurs when the
following additional conditions are veriﬁed:
Ψ(0) <0<Ψ(1). (9)
If there are multiple equilibria, the equilibrium where all sellers ﬁrst turn to quick
turn-around certiﬁers has higher seller welfare. Indeed, combining a revealed pref-
erence argument (Ψ(1) >0 ) and the fact that ρS(1)+δ(1 − ρ)S(b ρ2(1)) > ρS(1)+
δ(1−ρ)S(0) automatically yields the result. We maintain the maximization of seller
18Indeed, let the quick turn-around certiﬁer receive a quality signal σ, with distributions FH (σ)
and FL (σ) satisfying MLRP. The cutoﬀ rule σ∗ y i e l d st h es a m ea c c e p t a n c er a t ea sat i e r - 1c e r t i ﬁer
if
ρzH +( 1 − ρ)zL = 1 − ρ
where zH = FH (σ∗) and zL = 1 − FL (σ∗).
23welfare as our selection criterion, and so as long as Ψ(1) >0 ,the economy will ﬁnd
itself in the quick turn-around equilibrium.
When (8) is violated, the equilibrium is unique, and may be in mixed strategies. If
Ψ(1) ≥ 0 (and hence Ψ(0) >0 ), then the equilibrium involves quick turn-around cer-
tiﬁcation. When Ψ(0) ≤ 0(and hence Ψ(1) <0 ), then the equilibrium involves tier-1
certiﬁcation. When Ψ(1) <0<Ψ(0), then the equilibrium is in mixed strategies.
Proposition 6 Suppose that 0<z H <1− zL and that (6), (7) hold. If (8) holds,
then the equilibrium involves quick turn-around certiﬁcation if Ψ(1) ≥ 0 and tier-1
certiﬁcation otherwise. If (8) is violated, then the equilibrium involves quick turn-
around certiﬁcation when Ψ(1) ≥ 0, tier-1 certiﬁcation when Ψ(0) ≤ 0, and mixed
strategies otherwise.
Market structure and quick turn-around
We now analyze how market structure aﬀects the emergence of quick turn-around
certiﬁcation versus tiered certiﬁcation. More speciﬁcally, we maintain the assumption
that the market for tier-2 certiﬁers is perfectly competitive, and analyze the impact
of the degree of competition among tier-1 certiﬁers. We maintain throughout the
assumptions that 0<z H <1− zL, that (6) and (7) hold, and that Ψ(1) >0 .
T h er e s u l t st u r no u tt od e p e n do nt h en a t u r eo ft h i sc o m p e t i t i o n . W ea n a l y z e
two cases. In case (a), tier-1 certiﬁers charge a ﬁx e df e ea n dm a x i m i z ep r o ﬁts. In
case (b), tier-1 certiﬁers do no compete in prices. Rather, they care about market
share but have to incur a cost per submission, which depends on whether they opt
for tier-1 or quick turn-around certiﬁcation. Case (a) might be a better description
of rating agencies while case (b) might be a better model of scientiﬁc journals.
We start with case (a). Assume that there is a single, monopolistic tier-1 certiﬁer.
This tier-1 certiﬁer can choose between two strategies: tier-1 certiﬁcation and quick
turn-around certiﬁcation. In each case, the monopolist extracts all the sellers’ surplus
over and above the sellers’ welfare if the sellers were to go directly to a tier-2 certiﬁer.
24Therefore, the tier-1 certiﬁcation strategy yields monopoly proﬁt19
δ[ρS(1)+δ(1 − ρ)S(ρ)] − δS(ρ)
while the quick turn-around certiﬁcation strategy yields monopoly proﬁt
[ρ(1 − zH)+( 1 − ρ)zL]^ δS(ρ
+)+[ ρzH +( 1 − ρ)(1 − zL)]^ δδS(ρ) − δS(ρ)
The monopoly certiﬁer will therefore opt for a quick turn-around certiﬁcation strat-
egy if and only if the monopoly proﬁt is higher under the latter strategy than under









^ δδ[S(ρ) − S(b ρ2(1))].
Hence ΨM > Ψ(1) if and only if (8) holds. Therefore, with a monopolist tier-1
certiﬁer which charges a ﬁx e df e ea n dm a x i m i z e sp r o ﬁts, quick turn-around certi-
ﬁcation is more (less) likely than under competitive markets if (8) holds (doesn’t
hold). Similarly, one can look at an oligopolistic tier-1 structure with two (or more)
tier-1 certiﬁers competing in prices à la Bertrand: The outcome in the limit of small
diﬀerentiation is the same as when tier-1 certiﬁers are perfectly competitive. If there
is enough diﬀerentiation, on the other hand, then it can be the case in a Hotelling
duopoly where (8) holds, that quick turn-around certiﬁcation is less likely than under
perfect competition (See Appendix 2).
We now turn to case (b). We assume that the tier-1 certiﬁers’ objective function
is given by
[market share] ∗ [1 − c]
19Let F be the fee charged by the monopoly tier-1 certiﬁer. If
δS(ρ) ≥ δ[ρS(1)+δ(1 − ρ)S(ρ)] − F
then the tier-2 equilibrium exists and Pareto dominates any other equilibrium. If this inequality is
violated, then there is no tier-2 equilibrium and furthermore the tier-1 equilibrium exists as
δS(0) < δ[ρS(1)+δ(1 − ρ)S(0)] − F.
A similar reasoning applies to the computation of the monopoly proﬁt under quick turn-around
certiﬁcation.
25where c = cL for tier-1 certiﬁcation and c = cH for quick turn-around certiﬁcation.
We assume that cL <c H. In the case of peer-reviewed scientiﬁc journals, for example,
this might capture the cost for editors of pressing the referees to return their report
quickly.
A monopolist tier-1 certiﬁer would choose tier-1 certiﬁcation with a payoﬀ of
1−cL over quick turn-around certiﬁcation which yields only 1−cH. By contrast, in
an oligopoly with two (or more) tier-1 certiﬁers where
(1 − cL)/2 < 1 − cH (10)
then they will all choose quick turn-around certiﬁcation.20 Hence in this case, the
oligopolistic game features a form of prisoner’s dilemma and competition increases
quick turn-around certiﬁcation.
Proposition 7 Suppose that (6), (7) hold, and that Ψ(1) >0 .T h ee ﬀe c to fc o m -
petition on quick turn-around certiﬁcation depends on the nature of competition.
Competition decreases quick turn-around certiﬁcation if certiﬁers charge a ﬁxed fee
and compete in prices so as to maximize proﬁts if and only if (8) holds. By con-
trast, competition increases quick turn-around certiﬁcation if tier-1 certiﬁers do not
compete in prices but rather in market shares as long as (10) holds.
The theoretical prediction that competition enhances quick turn-around certiﬁca-
tion when certiﬁers compete in market shares and not in prices is largely consistent
with the historical experience among the leading academic journals in ﬁnance.21
While certainly highly inﬂuential ﬁnance papers were also published in more general
economics journals such as the Journal of Political Economy and the Bell Journal of
Economics,f o rm a n yy e a r st h e r ew a sas i n g l ed o m i n a n tﬁnance journal, the Journal
20If there are n tier-1 certiﬁers, then the condition for the equilibrium to feature quick turn-around
certiﬁcation is
(1 − cL)/n < 1 − cH
which is weaker, the higher n.
21This and the following two paragraphs are based on conversations with several current and
former editors of ﬁnance journals. We are particularly grateful to Cam Harvey and Bill Schwert for
sharing historical data with us.
26of Finance (JF). In 1973, Michael C. Jensen and his colleagues at the University
of Rochester spearheaded the formation of a new journal, the Journal of Financial
Economics (JFE).
One of the deﬁning aspects of the JFE from its initial conception by its editors
was its emphasis on rapid turn-around time for paper submissions. In its ﬁrst two
years, the median turn-around time for a submission was only three weeks. Due to
stringent pressure from the editors, as well as the then-novel feature of paying referees
for timely reviews (though the sums were rather nominal), review times remained
under ﬁve weeks for a dozen more years. The speed of review was in dramatic
contrast at the time to the other outlets where major ﬁnance publications appeared.
The emphasis on quick turn-around –in addition to the well-cited nature of many
of the initial papers published in the JFE– proved to be extremely attractive to
would-be authors. Consequently, the number of submissions to the journal soared:
the rejection rate fell from 41% in 1972 to 20.5% in 1978 to 13.5% in 1984. The gap
between the rejection rates of the JF and JFE in those years also narrowed, from
24% to 9% to 4%. During the 1980s, and particularly after the ascension of Rene
Stulz to its editorship, the JF shortened the average time in which its papers were
reviewed.
7 Multi-tier certiﬁcation
Let us return to error-free certiﬁcation, but assume now that certiﬁers can, at cost
c ≥ 0,p r o v i d eaﬁne grade if they choose so (which, in a competitive certifying
environment, is equivalent to the sellers’ wanting a ﬁne grade). We maintain the
assumption that d = 0 for expositional simplicity. In the same way they do not want
to disclose unsuccessful applications, tier-1 certiﬁers do not gain by transforming
themselves into multi-tier certiﬁers. The question is then whether tier-2 certiﬁers
disappear and how this aﬀects the sellers’ incentive to apply to tier-1 certiﬁers.
The broad intuition, which we develop in more detail below, goes as follows:
Sellers who would otherwise have applied directly to a tier-2 certiﬁer, can avoid the
adverse-selection stigma by turning to a multi-tier certiﬁer. This stigma avoidance
27however comes at a cost if sellers are information averse. If they are information
loving or neutral, and the cost of ﬁne grading is small, multi-tier certiﬁcation drives
out tier-2 certiﬁers; it also drives out tier-1 certiﬁers as resubmission after a rejection
b yat i e r - 1c e r t i ﬁer involves a delay and cannot prevent the buyers from knowing that
quality is not high. Thus, if ﬁne grading is costless, minimum-standard certiﬁcation
can survive only if sellers are information averse.
More generally, assume that c ≥ 0, and consider ﬁrst an ambitious-submission
equilibrium (x = 1) under minimum-standard certiﬁcation (Section 3). Sellers ob-
tain ρSH(1)+δ(1 − ρ)SL(0). But they can avoid discounting and obtain ρSH(1)+
(1 − ρ)SL(0) − c by turning to a multi-tier certiﬁer directly. The tiered-certiﬁcation
equilibrium therefore requires, besides condition (1), that
ρSH(1)+δ(1 − ρ)SL(0) ≥ ρSH(1)+( 1 − ρ)SL(0) − c ⇐⇒ (1 − δ)(1 − ρ)SL(0) ≤ c.
Second, consider a safe-strategy equilibrium (x = 0), and so condition (1) obtains.
This equilibrium is robust to the introduction of full-grading if and only if furthermore
ρSH(ρ)+( 1 − ρ)SL(ρ) ≥ ρSH(1)+( 1 − ρ)SL(0) − c,
i.e., when c = 0 if and only if the sellers are information averse.22
To sum up, sellers resort to multi-tier grading when its cost c is low, when sellers
are impatient (δ is low), and when sellers are information neutral or loving.
Conversion to multi-tier grading is a potential defense strategy by tier-2 certi-
ﬁers against the adverse-selection stigma. There is a sense in which tier-1 face less
pressure to convert to multi-tier grading: Namely there exist c and c,w i t hc> c >0
such that for c ≥ c, the equilibrium is as in Proposition 1 (i.e., a minimum-standard
22For the sake of completeness, we can consider a mixed equilibrium (0<x<1 ). A necessary
and suﬃcient condition for this equilibrium to be robust to the introduction of ﬁne grading is that
the sellers who apply directly to a tier-2 certiﬁer do not ﬁnd it advantageous to go for a full grade:
ρSH(b ρ(x)) + (1 − ρ)SL(b ρ(x)) ≥ ρSH(1)+( 1 − ρ)SL(0) − c.
28certiﬁcation) and for c≤ c ≤ c, the equilibrium remains a tier-1-certiﬁcation equi-
librium if this is what Proposition 1 predicts, but switches from a tier-2-certiﬁcation
equilibrium to a multi-tier equilibrium otherwise.23
Multi-tier grading as a defensive strategy by tier-2 certiﬁers seems to resonate
with our academic experience. Illustrations include ﬁne grading by Be Press and the
proliferation of prizes oﬀered by tier-2 journals (and not by tier-1 journals24).
Our assumption that certiﬁers can commit to a policy may be a bit stretched in
the case of multi-tier grading. Suppose that such a commitment is enforced by repu-
tational concerns, and consider a tier-2 certiﬁer trying to break a tiered-certiﬁcation
equilibrium by converting into a multi-tier grade certiﬁer. If sellers do not believe in
this strategy, the certiﬁer is deprived of high types and cannot (and has no incen-
tive to) develop a reputation for accurate, ﬁne grading. As we earlier announced, we
leave foundations of commitment for future research, but we note that our commit-
ment assumption may be more problematic for some forms of certiﬁcation than for
others.25
Proposition 8 Multi-tier grading is more likely, the lower its cost, and the more
23>From equation (1), tier-1 certiﬁcation prevails whenever
ρ[SH(1) − SH(ρ)] ≥ (1 − ρ)(1 − δ)SL(ρ).
Let
c ≡ ρ[SH(1) − SH(ρ)] − (1 − ρ)[SL(ρ) − SL(0)].
At c = c, the tier-2 equilibrium starts being replaced by a multi-tier equilibrium. But
(1 − δ)(1 − ρ)SL(0)=c − δ[SL(ρ) − SL(0)] < c,
and so a tier-1 equilibrium is robust at c = c.
24An apparent exception is provided by top ﬁnance journals. In their case, prizes may stem
from a desire to provide an attractive alternative to top-5 economics journals for authors valuing
publications in general economics outlets.
25We can however capture this idea through the following reduced form: Suppose that each
certiﬁer secretly chooses between spending 0 and spending c per review (say, by recruiting talented
employees), and announces publicly its certiﬁcation strategy (tier-1, tier-2, multi-tier); and that it
incurs a ﬁnite penalty for incorrect rankings. No certiﬁer has an incentive to invest in the cost c per
review if sellers choose an ambitious strategy and believe that certiﬁers do not invest in the extra
cost.
29impatient and the less information-averse the sellers are.
Proposition 8 focuses on a competitive certifying industry. Appendix 1 by con-
trast considers a monopoly certiﬁer who can costlessly engage in ﬁne grading; it
performs a mechanism design exercise and shows how eﬃcient disclosure relates to
the sellers’ information aversion.
Proposition 8 may shed some light on rating agencies’ practice of ﬁne grading.
As we observed in Example 3 (Section 2), bond ratings not only certify the quality
of an issue but also allow matching between securities and buyers. This matching
dimension became more important in the mid 1970s, when broker-dealers’ regulatory
assessment of solvency (and then insurers’, pension funds’, and, with Basel II, banks’)
started to make use of ratings, creating a strong demand for high-quality liquid
claims. The mid-1970s coincidentally were a turning point in the business model of
rating agencies, which switched to the issuer-pays mode.
8S u m m a r y a n d c o n c l u s i o n
Certiﬁers such as rating agencies, journals, standard setting bodies or providers of
standardized tests play an increasingly important role in our disintermediated market
economies. Yet as scrutiny of rating agencies in the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis
has shown, these organizations have complex incentive structures and may adopt
problematic approaches. This paper makes an initial attempt at understanding how
the certiﬁcation industry caters to the certiﬁed party’s demand through strategies
such as the non-disclosure of rejections, and analyzes the welfare implications of such
policies.
The ﬁrst insight is that, in the absence of regulation, certiﬁers have a strong
incentive not to publicize rejected applications.
On the normative side, sellers’ gaming of the certiﬁcation process involves costs:
delay (or, in a variant of our model, duplication of certiﬁcation costs) and possibly
excessive information exposure; these costs were shown to provide a role for trans-
parency regulation. We showed that transparency regulation always beneﬁts sellers,
30but need not beneﬁtu s e r s .
On the positive side, we examined when sellers are willing to take the risk of
applying to a tier-1 certiﬁer. This willingness hinges on the behavior of other sellers
(which aﬀects the stigma associated with a tier-2 acceptance), the discount factor
(which impacts the cost of an ambitious submission strategy), the accuracy of the
sellers’ self-assessment (more realistic self-estimates favoring tiered certiﬁcation), and
sellers’ information aversion (which determines the reputation-risk tolerance). We
further showed that multi-tier grading may be a rational response by tier-2 certiﬁers
to the stigma carried by their endorsement.
We also analyzed the impact of entry by certiﬁers who oﬀer a low turn-around
time and a lower accuracy. Such certiﬁers, if they appeal to sellers, create less stigma
for tier-2 certiﬁcation than tier-1 certiﬁers do. We characterized the conditions under
which sellers will indeed turn to such “quick turn-around” certiﬁcation. We further
showed that the more competitive the industry, the more likely it is that certiﬁers
oﬀer a low (high) turn-around time if certiﬁers maximize market share (proﬁts).
Finally, we examined when certiﬁers might adopt more complex rating schemes,
rather than the simple pass-fail scheme. We highlighted that such nuanced schemes
are more likely when the costs of such ratings are lower. In addition, these schemes
are more common when sellers are less averse to the revelation of information about
their quality and more impatient.
Turning back to Table 1, it is not surprising in light of our theoretical predictions
that the bulk of the entries are under the opaque heading. State licensing exam-
inations may be fundamentally diﬀerent due to the presence of regulatory dicta.
Entry-level examinations exhibit transparency and ﬁne grading. These features may
reﬂect the power imbalance between the buyers (colleges) and sellers (would-be stu-
dents). In this instance, it is the buyers rather than the sellers who choose certiﬁers,
which probably explains the unusual entry in Table 1.26 Finally, and also consistent
with our theory, it is not surprising that in situations where we would anticipate
that risk aversion would be greatest (e.g., an undergraduate or MBA student going
26Top schools want to be matched with top students. They therefore have an incentive to demand
tier-1 certiﬁcation, or, better in an environment with mistakes, ﬁne and transparent grading.
31on the job market, an entrepreneurial ﬁrm going public), we see minimum standard
certiﬁcation rather than a ﬁne-grained scheme.
This paper leaves open a number of interesting questions. We conclude by dis-
cussing a few of these.
• Two-sided certiﬁcation markets.
We have assumed that certiﬁers cater to the sellers. This is the case in particular
if buyers are dispersed and can share the information, and so certiﬁers cannot charge
the buyer side.
Academic journals have traditionally charged the buying side. They bundled,
however, the certiﬁcation and distribution function. The distribution function nowa-
days can be performed through web sites and web repositories (although journals try
to keep the two activities bundled through requirements not to keep papers posted
once they are accepted). Does the recent advocacy in favor of open access publishing
(charging authors rather than readers) reﬂect this new scope for unbundling? An
interesting literature (e.g., McCabe-Snyder 2005, 2007a,b and Jeon-Rochet 2007) an-
alyzes certiﬁcation from the point of view of two-sided markets theory. In particular,
it looks at when academic journals should charge readers or authors, and how the
quality of certiﬁcation is aﬀected by this choice. By way of contrast, the issues of
transparency and sequential certiﬁcation remain yet to be investigated in this con-
text. One may, for instance, wonder whether the certiﬁers’ ability to charge buyers
would lead to more transparency.
• Horizontal aspects.
Certiﬁers diﬀerentiate not only through their standards (the vertical dimension),
but also with respect to the audience they target on the buyer side. For instance,
an interesting question in academic certiﬁc a t i o ni st h er e l a t i v er o l eo fg e n e r a l i s ta n d
ﬁeld journals. In economics, for instance, the most valued publications are the top-5
generalist journals, but top ﬁeld journals do extremely well and seem to dominate
second-tier generalist journals.
Papers may be classiﬁed through their vertical component (quality) as well as
the scope of their potential readership (a “generalist” paper is more appropriate for
32a broader audience than a “specialist” paper). A possibility is that being accepted
at a good specialist journal carries less stigma than being accepted at a second-tier
generalist one: the paper may have been rejected because it is too specialized, but
still have very high quality.
The same patterns are seen in other contexts as well. For instance, from the 1960s
through 1990s, four investment banks specializing in technology ﬁrms–Hambrecht
& Quist, Alex. Brown, Robertson Stephens and Unterberg Towbin (later supplanted
by Montgomery Securities)–had an inﬂuence that belied their modest sizes. They
frequently participated in the underwriting of the largest technology oﬀerings, often
in partnership with the most prestigious “bulge bracket” investment banks (Brandt
and Weisel, 2003). Similarly, a strategy adopted by many of the successful new
entrants into the venture capital industry has been to adopt a well-deﬁned special-
ization, and then seek to co-invest with prestigious groups which might not otherwise
have considered working with a new organization.
• Other second-tier certiﬁer strategies to deal with adverse selection.
Grading is a potential response by certiﬁers to adverse selection problems. We
may think about other strategies. For example, second-tier journals sometimes or-
ganize successful special issues, which by building “network eﬀects”, may carry less
stigma. It would be interesting to understand whether special issues have more ap-
peal to second-tier journals, and, if so, whether this is due to a visibility eﬀect (tier-1
journals having less need for visibility) or to a quality eﬀect (special issues compro-
mising quality less for tier-2 journals). In a similar vein, less established certiﬁers have
attempted to distinguish themselves through innovation (for instance, Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert’s development of the junk bond market). These issues would deserve
further exploration.
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35Appendix 1 (mechanism design for a monopoly certiﬁer
under costless ﬁne grading)
For expositional simplicity, we assume that the certiﬁer does not discount the
future (maximizes steady-state proﬁts) and can perform ﬁn eg r a d i n ga tn oc o s t( c =
0). Adopting a mechanism design approach, let FH(b ρ) and FL(b ρ) denote the c.d.fs of














b ρdFi(b ρ) for i ∈ {H,L}
b ρH ≥ ρ and b ρL ≤ 1 − ρ.
In words, b ρi is the average ex post reputation of type i. Condition (11) just expresses
the martingale property of beliefs.
Rather than solving this program in full generality, we study several cases of
interest.
(a) Sellers are strongly information loving.
In this case, the convexity of Si implies that
S ≤ T ≡ ρ[b ρHSH(1)+( 1 − b ρH)SH(0)] + (1 − ρ)[b ρLSL(1)+( 1 − b ρL)SL(0)].
Maximizing T with respect to constraint (11) (with multiplier μ) yields ﬁrst-order
conditions:
∂L
∂e ρH = ρ[SH(1) − SH(0) − μ] ≤ 0, with equality if b ρH >0
∂L
∂e ρL =( 1 − ρ)[SL(1) − SL(0) − μ] ≤ 0, with equality if b ρL >0 .
36Because SH(1) − SH(0) ≥ SL(1) − SL(0), the program admits b ρH = 1 and b ρL = 0 as
a solution: Fine grading is optimal, and
S =ρSH(1)+( 1 − ρ)SL(0).
(b) Sellers are strongly information averse.
A symmetric proof shows that it is then optimal to have tier-2 certiﬁcation. And
so:
S =ρSH(ρ)+( 1 − ρ)SL(ρ).
(c) Spillovers from adoption (example 2).
Suppose (as in Lerner-Tirole 2006) that
Si(b ρ)=si1 I{Ee ρ[b]≥0}.
Clearly if Eρ[b]=ρbH +( 1 − ρ)bL ≥ 0, the optimum is a pooling one (tier-2
certiﬁcation). So let us assume that
ρbH +( 1 − ρ)bL <0 .
Let ρ∗ > ρ be deﬁned by
ρ
∗bH +( 1 − ρ
∗)bL = 0.
One has:
S = ρsH +
ρ(1 − ρ∗)
ρ∗ sL.





ρ +( 1 − ρ)u
.
Optimal certiﬁcation is then intermediate between a tier-1 and a tier-2 certiﬁer:
less stringent than the former, but more demanding than the latter.
37Appendix 2 (quick turn-around equilibrium in a Hotelling
duopoly game)
Consider a Hotelling duopoly game between two tier-1 certiﬁers where the diﬀer-
entiation parameter t is large enough so that both ﬁrms have positive market share.
In a symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium, then each ﬁrm charges fee F = t/2. Let
W
1 (^ ρ2) ≡ ρS(1)+δ(1 − ρ)S(^ ρ2),
W
3 (^ ρ2) ≡
^ δ
δ
[[ρ(1 − zH)+( 1 − ρ)zL]S(ρ
+)+δ[ρzH +( 1 − ρ)(1 − zL)]S(^ ρ2)]
and let
ρ



















Consider a quick turn-around equilibrium. If one of the two certiﬁers deviates to
become tier-1 and charges F (in general, F 6= t/2) ,t h e nt h em a r k e ts h a r eo ft h eo t h e r
certiﬁer is
y ≡
t +( t/2 − F)+δ
£




It is easy to show that, for the optimal F associated with the deviation
W
1 (^ ρ2 (y)) >W
3 (^ ρ2 (y))







then for y given by (12), ^ ρ2 (y) < ρ− and
W
1 (^ ρ2 (y)) >W
3 (^ ρ2 (y))
if (8) holds. And so, the quick turn-around equilibrium exists for a smaller set of
parameters than for a perfectly competitive industry.
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